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This article rejoins one of the core debates in investor-state arbitration, over the extent to 
which arbitrators may refer to sources of international law beyond the investment treaty that 
governs the dispute. This issue may appear esoteric, but the political backlash to investment 
treaty arbitration is largely fueled by uncertainty over the content of the substantive rules 
that bind states in their relations with foreign investors. Such uncertainty affords arbitrators 
room to indulge what is alleged to be a pro-investor bias. It may chill regulatory initiatives, 
even if in the end most states’ actions are vindicated. The problem at the heart of investment 
arbitration is, therefore, a legal one, so there may be a legal response to the political backlash. 
This article argues that arbitrators are obligated by the choice of law clauses contained in 
most investment treaties to consider all potentially relevant sources of international law. 
Arbitrators are akin to agents of the states that enter into investment treaties, and are bound 
by choice of law provisions in those treaties. Since most of these refer simply to the text of 
the treaty and “international law”, tribunals not only may but must refer to international 
law beyond the treaty. Putting choice of law at the centre of determinations of tribunals’ 
interpretive authority refocuses arbitrators’ attention on states, which are, after all, the parties 
to the arbitration agreements that empower investor-state tribunals. It gives proper weight 
to the economic objectives of international investment law, but also provides arbitrators 
with an appropriate basis on which to account for the public interest, via international law 
doctrines of environmental protection, indigenous rights, and the like. Finally, it could help 
stave off a continued backlash to investor-state arbitration, which would harm the global 
investment climate and the global rule of law.
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I. Introduction: Reconceiving the “Backlash” to 
Investment Arbitration
Arbitration of investment treaty disputes is in the news a lot these days, and usually because someone new is denouncing it. Most 
prominently, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) and Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) are probably now 
dead letters, attacked most bitterly in the places that pioneered – and 
historically benefitted the most from – investment treaty arbitration: the 
USA and Western Europe. Recent political events, especially the Brexit 
vote and the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency, indicate 
that new investment treaties are less likely to be ratified, especially if 
incorporated into multilateral trade conventions. 
It is therefore all the more important that the existing system of 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) be made to work better for 
its purported beneficiaries: the people of the states that engage in it.1 
Investment treaty arbitration, along with other means for peaceful 
1. Cf. Ingo Venzke, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement in TTIP from 
the Perspective of a Public Law Theory of International Adjudication” 
(2016) 7:3 Journal of World Investment & Trade 374 (arguing that “the 
architects of TTIP as well as the critics of this edifice seem to share a core 
point – the demand, namely, that the law be spoken in the name of the 
peoples and citizens” at 380).
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resolution of disputes between investors and the states that host their 
investments, has the potential to stimulate foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and promote the rule of law. Investment treaty arbitration is 
not now living up to that potential. However, should states abandon it 
because of its flaws, they may also miss out on its benefits.
This article advances a new way of thinking about the causes of 
hostility to arbitration between investors and states, then proposes a new 
way of thinking about how to improve the quality and consistency of the 
justice provided by investor-state arbitration without making structural 
changes to the ISDS system. The backlash to investor-state arbitration is 
driven by political concerns, but there may be a legal response to it.
One of the core debates about investor-state arbitration concerns the 
extent to which arbitrators may refer sources of international law outside 
the text of the investment treaty that governs the dispute. This is essentially 
a question of interpretation: to what sources may adjudicators refer when 
clarifying ambiguities and filling gaps in the treaties, statutes, and contracts 
that govern different aspects of an investor-state dispute, and how should 
they resolve conflicts between these sources. Some commentators argue 
that investment arbitration tribunals should decide, to the extent possible, 
within the text of the governing treaty and the investment contract – 
“restrictive interpretation”.2 Others argue that general international law 
is relevant both to interpret the relevant treaty and to introduce doctrines 
not referred to in the treaty, including principles developed in treaties 
and case law outside the investment context, in particular international 
2. This view is perhaps most associated with Charles Brower. See e.g. 
Charles N Brower & Sadie Blanchard, “From ‘Dealing in Virtue’ to 
‘Profiting from Injustice’: The Case Against Re-Statification of Investment 
Dispute Settlement” (2014) 55:45 Harvard International Law Journal 
Online, online: <www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
Brower_Blanchard_to_Publish.pdf>; Charles N Brower & Shashank P 
Kumar, “Investomercial Arbitration: Whence Cometh It? What Is It? 
Whither Goeth It?” (2014) 30 ICSID Review 35; and Charles N Brower 
& Sadie Blanchard, “What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State 
Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States” 
(2014) 52:3 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 689.
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trade and human rights law – “extensive interpretation”.3 A third school 
of thought emphasizes the public law nature of investment disputes, 
arguing that tribunals determining whether a state has breached its 
obligations to a foreign investor ought to take a public law approach 
that emphasizes national rather than international law.4 These threads in 
the academic discourse are connected to more fundamental discussions 
about the place of investment law within international law, which are in 
turn related to broader debates over fragmentation and convergence in 
international law.5
Such matters may appear to be esoteric, of concern only to academics 
and policy wonks. In fact, the theoretical and political debates over 
investment treaty arbitration are both largely fueled by the same basic 
concern: uncertainty over the content of the substantive rules that bind 
states in their relations with foreign investors. The substantive provisions 
of most of the relevant instruments are incomplete and vaguely worded, 
and it is hotly contested how arbitrators should fill these gaps and resolve 
these ambiguities
The gaps and ambiguities create a zone of discretion for arbitrators that 
many see as too broad – an issue that affects international law generally, 
3. See e.g. Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al, eds, Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
4. See generally Stephan W Schill, ed, International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010); see 
also Stephan W Schill, “Enhancing International Investment Law’s 
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New 
Public Law Approach” (2011) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 
57 at 68-71, 81; Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W Schill, “Public Law 
Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions 
in the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality” in Stephan W 
Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 75. 
5. See generally Freya Baetens, ed, Investment Law Within International 
Law: Integrationist Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013).
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but is particularly acute in international investment law.6 The breadth of 
arbitral discretion gives arbitrators space to indulge what is alleged to be 
a pro-investor bias and permits tribunals to overrule reasonable attempts 
by states to regulate commerce in the public interest.7 The uncertainty 
that results may chill regulatory initiatives, even if states’ actions are 
vindicated by arbitral awards in the end.8 The obscurity of the process 
(and, secrecy, although less than in the past) add to the sense that some 
kind of scam is being run. 
The problem at the heart of ISDS is therefore a legal one, which means 
that there may be a legal response to the political backlash. Investor-
state tribunals must recognize that their interpretive role in resolving 
individual disputes implies a more fundamental role as guardians of the 
coherence of investment law itself.9 To play this role properly, tribunals 
must adopt a coherent interpretive approach. This article argues that, 
when interpreting investment treaties, arbitrators are not only permitted 
to consider sources of international law from outside investment treaties, 
but are in most cases obligated to do by the choice of law provisions 
in those treaties. Arbitral tribunals are akin to agents of the states that 
enter into investment treaties, and must follow choice of law provisions 
in investment treaties. In most cases, the law governing investor-state 
6. Gleider Hernandez, “Interpretive Authority and the International 
Judiciary” in Andrea Bianchi et al, eds, Interpretation in International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 167.
7. Many of these charges are collected in a report published by the Corporate 
Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute. See Pia Eberhardt & 
Cecilia Olivet, “Profiting from Injustice: How law firms, arbitrators, and 
financiers are fuelling an investment arbitration boom” (November 2012), 
online: <www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf>.
8. Jürgen Kurtz, “Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-
State Arbitration: On Consistency, Coherence, and the Identification 
of Applicable Law” in Zachary Douglas et al, eds, The Foundations 
of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014) (“[e]ven with an outcome ledger that tilts generally in favour of 
respondents, the deep variances in the jurisprudence make it almost 
impossible for states to isolate when and why particular regulatory 
initiatives might potentially engage investment treaty liability” at 270).
9. Hernandez, supra note 6 at 167-68.
222 
 
Karton, Law and Interpretive Authority in Investor-State Arbitration
arbitrations is simply the text of the treaty and “international law”,10 
which means that arbitral tribunals not only may but must refer to 
international law outside the treaty.
This article is premised on the current ISDS system remaining 
roughly in its current form. Here, I take no position on whether or 
how the system ought to change structurally. Rather, my aim is to show 
that a greater attention to the governing law would improve arbitral 
decision-making without any structural changes – and moreover that the 
approach I advocate is dictated by the structure of the existing system of 
investor-state arbitrations. My line of argument is theoretical rather than 
pragmatic, although I believe that it will also yield practical benefits.
The proposed interpretive approach gives proper weight to the 
economic objectives of international investment law, but also provides 
arbitrators with an appropriate legal basis on which to account for the 
public interest, in the form of international law doctrines of environmental 
protection, indigenous rights, and the like. It also refocuses arbitrators’ 
attention on states, which are, after all, the parties to the arbitration 
agreements that empower investor-state tribunals. Employment of a 
coherent interpretive approach that pays attention to the choice of law 
would help improve the quality and consistency of arbitral decision-
making and, in turn, promote buy-in from governments and the 
populations they represent. It would also reaffirm investment law’s 
place within international law and promote cross-fertilization between 
investment law and other international legal disciplines.
Part II provides background, explaining how many of the criticisms 
of investment treaty arbitration are rooted in uncertainty over how 
the governing law is interpreted and applied. Part III presents the 
core theoretical argument: that the structure of arbitral authority in 
international investment law requires arbitrators to consult the choice 
of law provision in the applicable investment agreement in order to 
determine not only which laws to apply, but also how to interpret them. 
Part IV applies those theoretical arguments to describe, in the abstract, 
10. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (this is something of an 
oversimplification).
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how investment treaty tribunals ought to proceed. Finally, Part V explains 
the main implications of the proposed approach, making prescriptions 
about how states may act to shape arbitrators’ interpretive authority and 
how arbitrators ought to interpret IIAs in the majority of cases where 
the treaty contains an unqualified choice of “international law” as the 
governing law.
Before proceeding, a brief note on terminology is needed, since 
authors in this field sometimes use the same terms to refer to different 
things and different terms to refer to the same things. I will refer to the 
overall system of resolving disputes between investors and the states 
in which they invest as “investor-state dispute settlement” (ISDS) 
and the heterogeneous body of rules relating to the international law 
obligations of states to foreign investors as international investment 
law (IIL). As the label for the main legal instruments of that system, I 
use “international investment agreements” (IIAs), which describes any 
agreement between states that has the purpose and effect of protecting 
cross-border investments, whether those agreements are bilateral or 
multilateral, whether they deal specifically with investment or with trade 
more generally, and whether they are memorialized in a treaty or in some 
other form. Finally, to describe the primary means of resolving disputes 
between investors and states that relate to IIAs, I will use “investor-state 
arbitration” (ISA), although that term might conceivably also refer to 
arbitrations between investors and states that do not arise from IIAs.
II. Understanding the “Backlash”: Uncertainty over 
the Governing Law
It is now de rigueur to call political hostility to ISA the “backlash” against 
investment arbitration. It is an appropriate term, since it captures the 
reactive nature of much criticism of ISA, especially from politicians 
and civil society. For many years ISA proceeded without opposition, 
primarily because the general public and even most legislators had no 
idea it existed. Since the term “backlash” was introduced to the literature 
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in 2010,11 hostility to ISDS, and in particular to ISA, has only grown. 
The components of this backlash are various. Some critics are 
concerned about state sovereignty, some about environmental or human 
rights protection, some about inconsistent outcomes, some about 
democratic accountability, some about transparency, some about bias. 
But many of the critiques of ISDS derive in part from one common 
factor: the content of rules that will be applied to determine the merits 
of investor-state disputes.
The problem of inconsistency is most obviously traceable to 
uncertainty in the governing law, but other critiques can also be 
characterized in terms of uncertainty. Given that state liability through 
ISA is voluntary, it is not clear how much ISA could possibly “rob” states 
of their sovereignty, but it is fair to argue that states have given up more 
of their sovereignty than they realized when they ratified an IIA. Greater 
certainty would at least make possible more informed decisions by states 
on whether to enter into IIAs, how to draft them, whether to make 
interpretive pronouncements after the entry into force of an IIA, and 
how to pose arguments to a tribunal once a dispute arises.
Similarly, concerns about the ability of states to regulate in the public 
interest despite their IIL obligations are really concerns about the content 
of the governing law. How do the obligations created by IIAs relate to 
countervailing principles of domestic public law? Are IIL obligations 
supplemented or limited by substantive obligations created by other 
areas of international law, in particular human rights law? Finally, how 
do international law doctrines relating to the force of international 
obligations, such as the law on state responsibility and doctrines like 
proportionality and the margin of appreciation, affect states’ obligations 
under IIL? 
Of course, some of the critiques are not about the law being applied, 
but rather about who applies it. One strain of critique emphasizes the 
private character of arbitral tribunals, and argues that ISA tribunals in 
particular are populated by business lawyers who are subjectively biased 
11. Michael Waibel et al, eds, The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2010).
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in favour of investors and who have material incentives to take an 
expansive attitude toward their own jurisdiction and the obligations of 
states to investors. Regardless of the accuracy of these charges, much of 
their force would be reduced if the content of IIL were more certain – the 
more concrete and precise the applicable rules are, the less room there is 
for adjudicator bias to affect outcomes. 
Uncertainty over the governing law has a variety of causes, many 
of them not resolvable without altering the nature of international law 
or the structure of the ISDS system. Perhaps most importantly, IIL is 
expressed in thousands of different IIAs concluded by different states 
using different language; unlike other fields of international law, such as 
the law of the sea or international trade law, IIL has no common treaty 
or set of treaties that sets out the substantive obligations of states. The 
closest thing to a canonical treaty is the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States12 (“ICSID 
Convention”), which deals only with the means by which disputes over 
IIL are to be resolved, and in any event applies only to a subset of investor-
state disputes. But even when one looks beyond the various IIAs, public 
international law continues to have an inherent indeterminacy greater 
than any national law, something that no one ISDS tribunal can resolve. 
Even the status of international law as “law” continues to be contested 
in some quarters (although much less so than in the past). Relatedly, the 
youth of IIL as a distinct field of law means that many of its details remain 
to be worked out, simply because the issues have only arisen recently.
Moreover, the lack of any centralized legislative or judicial authority 
with the power to pronounce on matters of IIL necessarily slows the 
progressive development of the law, as is the fact that interpreting IIL is 
largely left to ad hoc arbitral tribunals that recognize neither an adjudicative 
hierarchy nor any doctrine of binding precedent. Sociologically, one 
might add that the community of international investment lawyers – and 
more specifically of ISDS arbitrators, do not share a common professional 
background or legal culture, and in fact may be divided between two 
12. March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) 
[ICSID Convention] (also called the “Washington Convention”).
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camps of commercial lawyers and public international lawyers. Finally, 
the parties to ISAs – investors and capital-importing states – are often 
repeat players who have irreconcilably opposed interests.
But regardless of the causes of legal uncertainty, many of them would 
be resolved or deprived of their significance by a more consistent approach 
to the interpretation of the governing legal instruments. Writes Kurtz, 
“Ultimately … it is the coherence and integrity of reasoning employed 
by arbitral tribunals that is of greatest import to states parties (with 
the highest potential to foster deeper commitment to the system)”.13 
Unfortunately, ISA tribunals have not met this challenge. “[T]here is 
a distinct and peculiar ‘moving target’ quality to the hermeneutics of 
investment arbitration with arbitral tribunals often paying simple lip 
service to the customary rules on treaty interpretation”.14
The decisions of ISA tribunals should not and will never be entirely 
consistent, given the variety of differently-worded IIAs that apply in 
various ISAs, the different national laws that may apply to some aspects 
of disputes, and the range of legitimate opinions on legal questions that 
arise in disparate ISAs. However, the impossibility and undesirability of 
consistent outcomes in ISDS should not make us give up on a consistent 
interpretive approach. In the next section, I argue that ISA tribunals are 
obligated by the structure of arbitral authority in ISDS to follow such a 
consistent interpretive approach. 
III. The Structure of Arbitral Authority in the 
Investment Arbitration System
It is a common misconception that ISA tribunals have broad inherent 
discretion with respect to the governing law, for example to interpret IIAs 
in a restrictive or extensive manner, and to consider or reject principles 
of international law developed outside the investment context. In fact, 
while in a given case the tribunal may have such discretion, whether it 
does or does not depends on the terms of the choice of law provision 
in the relevant IIA. In other words, when states conclude an IIA, they 
13. Kurtz, supra note 8 at 258.
14. Ibid at 275.
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have the power to determine not only the set of rules that tribunals must 
apply, but also the way in which tribunals must interpret them.
The legal framework that supports ISA imposes very few constraints 
on the way arbitrators are to interpret the governing law. Rather, arbitral 
authority to interpret law, along with any restrictions on the exercise of 
that authority, comes from agreement that empowers the tribunal. For 
this reason, regardless of its public international law context, ISA has 
an inherently contractarian character, an inheritance of the international 
commercial arbitration models on which ISA jurisdictional and procedural 
rules are based. In IIL, the agreement that empowers the tribunal is 
usually contained in the applicable IIA. According to the “triangular” 
nature of ISA, when states ratify an IIA, they make an “open offer” to 
arbitrate. This offer may be accepted by any investor from another state 
party simply by filing a request for arbitration, even if the investor lacks 
a pre-existing legal relationship with the state.15 The terms of the offer 
to arbitrate are specified in the IIA, and initiation of arbitration by the 
investor constitutes the investor’s acceptance of those terms. 
As will be seen, questions about the scope of the tribunal’s powers 
and duties with respect to the decision on the merits cannot normally be 
answered by reference to general law, but rather according to the terms of 
the applicable IIA, and in particular the choice of law provision within it, 
along with and any other agreements entered into between the host state 
and the investor.
I will begin by examining the provisions of the treaties that form the 
framework of the ISDS system, but do not themselves contain arbitration 
agreements: the ICSID Convention16 and the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards17 (“New 
15. Julian Davis Mortenson, “Treaty Interpretation in International 
Investment Law” in Michael Bowman & Dino Krisiotis, eds, Conceptual 
and Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of Treaties (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2017) at 2, online: <ssrn.com/
abstract=2757690/>.
16. ICSID Convention, supra note 12.
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York Convention”). The former applies to all investor-state arbitrations 
conducted under the auspices of ICSID,18 and the latter applies to nearly 
all investor-state arbitrations conducted ad hoc (which are typically 
governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) or under the auspices of 
other international arbitral institutions.19 
The ICSID Convention and New York Convention do not directly 
bind arbitrators or arbitrants; rather, they are directed at national courts, 
which may be called upon to rule on the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements and arbitration awards. By design, the two conventions say 
next-to-nothing about the actual decisions made by arbitrators. For this 
reason, and with a few exceptions that will be discussed below, they do 
not regulate the decisions arbitrators make on the merits of disputes, or 
even the rules of decision which arbitrators must apply, but only the way 
in which arbitrators reach those decisions.
Under New York Convention Article V, which governs the enforcement 
of arbitral awards, the grounds for refusal of enforcement are generally 
jurisdictional and procedural. Only two provisions might conceivably be 
engaged by an inapposite or inaccurate application of the governing law. 
The first is Article V(2)(b), the public policy exception, which permits 
non-enforcement of an award only in narrow circumstances where 
enforcement would violate the fundamental public policy of the state.20 
To the author’s knowledge, no commercial or investor-state arbitral 
award has ever been refused enforcement under Article V(2)(b) on the 
ground that the tribunal misinterpreted the governing law.
18. See International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
“Recognition and Enforcement – Additional Facility Arbitration”, online: 
<icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Recognition-and-Enforcement-
(AF-Arbitration).aspx>. The New York Convention also applies to the 
recognition and enforcement of awards not subject to the ICSID 
Convention that are administered by ICSID under the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules. 
19. As a general matter, the New York Convention applies equally to 
commercial and investor-state arbitration. Awards that arise from IIAs 
involving non-parties to the New York Convention, such as Taiwan, will 
not be subject to it. 
20. New York Convention, supra note 17, art V(2)(b).
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The second is Article V(1)(d), which provides that awards may be 
refused enforcement where the arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties. In extreme cases where the tribunal 
blatantly applied a law different from the one chosen by the parties or 
where the tribunal’s reasons display a total lack of legal reasoning, courts 
have held that the tribunal’s actions constituted a procedural defect and 
refused enforcement on that basis.21 
To the extent that arbitrators make errors of law or reach a decision 
other than by application of the governing law, courts will not normally 
interfere unless those errors were so egregious as to constitute arbitrator 
misconduct (harming a party’s due process rights or other otherwise 
violating public policy), the award blatantly applies a different law than 
the law chosen by the parties, or the award so disregards all legal rules that 
the tribunal can be said to have arrogated to itself amiable composition 
powers.22 If arbitrators apply the governing law incompetently, or if 
they pay lip service to the law while actually deciding on some other 
basis, the award is generally proof from challenge. Under New York 
Convention Article V and most national laws, including those based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
21. Only in a handful of commercial cases subject to the New York Convention 
have awards been annulled or refused enforcement on this basis. The 
case law is reviewed and discussed in James Hope & Mattias Rosengren, 
“Arbitrators: a law unto themselves?” (3 December 2013), Commercial 
Dispute Resolution, online: <cdr-news.com/categories/expert-views/4616-
arbitrators:-a-law-unto-themselves>.
22. Cf. Jan H Dalhuisen, “Legal Reasoning and Powers of International 
Arbitrators” (2014), online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2393705/> (“[t]here are minimum standards but they are few and only 
geared to avoiding clear excess” at 22).
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there is no recourse against a legally incorrect award.23
For arbitrations subject to the ICSID Convention, which includes 
most ISAs, the rules differ but the outcome is the same. The ICSID 
Convention itself imposes only one duty directly upon tribunals relating 
to how they should decide the merits of the dispute: the requirement in 
Article 42(2) that tribunals may not bring a finding of non liquet on the 
ground of silence or obscurity in the law. Arguably, this provision imposes 
an obligation to decide legally, that is, in accordance with legal rules, but 
it does no more than this. In any event, it says nothing about which rules 
should be applied or how they should be interpreted. Moreover, Article 
42(3) makes clear that the parties may empower the tribunal to decide 
ex aequo et bono, so it is not even compulsory for ICSID tribunals decide 
according to legal rules.24
Article 42(1) contains the ICSID Convention’s main rules as to the 
governing law:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as 
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal 
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including 
its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.25
According to the first sentence of Article 42(1), the parties may make 
a choice of law and, if they do so, the tribunal must apply that law. 
In other words, the parties have absolute freedom to choose any rules 
23. Courts frequently reaffirm this principle; see e.g. TCL Air Conditioner 
(Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia [2013] 
HCA 5. I leave aside whether parties may agree to confer upon courts (of 
the seat or otherwise) the power to review awards for substantive errors 
of law. State courts have divided on the validity of so-called heightened 
judicial review agreements; see, e.g. the divergent decisions of the US and 
German Supreme Courts: Hall St Assocs v Mattel, 552 US 576 (2008); 
BGH III ZB 07/06, 1 March 2007.
24. See generally Christoph Schreuer, “Decisions Ex Aequo et Bono Under 
the ICSID Convention” (1996) 11:1 ICSID Review 37. Determination 
ex aequo et bono permits adjudicators the greatest possible latitude to 
consider justice and fairness without the need to resort to any rules of law; 
it is quite rare in practice.
25. ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art 42(1).
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of law and their choice is binding upon the tribunal. If the parties do 
not make a choice, the second sentence of Article 42(1) provides that 
the tribunal must apply the law of the respondent state, together with 
whatever rules of international law are applicable. This default provision 
does require tribunals to apply the named laws, but it does nothing to 
guide the tribunal’s interpretation of national or international law, beyond 
specifying that a state’s law includes its rules on the conflict of laws. 
Most importantly for the purposes of this article, it implicitly delegates 
to tribunals the determination of which rules of international law are 
applicable and places no constraints whatsoever upon that determination.
Awards subject to the ICSID Convention are even more broadly 
enforceable than those subject to the New York Convention. Under Article 
54, contracting states “shall recognize [awards] rendered pursuant to” the 
Convention, and must enforce “the pecuniary obligations imposed by 
that award … as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State”.26 
The only exception given in the ICSID Convention itself is the statement 
in Article 55 that national laws relating to sovereign immunity are not 
affected by the Convention. States may also refuse to enforce ICSID 
awards that violate the fundamental public policy of the state, but to 
the author’s knowledge, as with New York Convention Article V(2)(b), 
no ICSID award has been refused enforcement on public policy grounds 
because the tribunal misinterpreted the law.
ICSID awards are also subject to annulment by a three-member 
ad hoc annulment committee constituted for that specific purpose.27 
Annulled awards have no force, so parties unwilling to treat the dispute 
as ended must request the constitution of a new tribunal.28 The ICSID 
Convention lists only five grounds on which an award may be annulled, of 
which only two are potentially relevant here: that the tribunal “manifestly 
exceeded its powers”29 or that the award fails to “state the reasons on 
which it is based”.30 An examination of the way these provisions have 
26. Ibid, art 54(1).
27. Ibid, art 52.
28. Ibid, art 52(6).
29. Ibid, art 52(1)(b).
30. Ibid, art 52(1)(e).
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been applied by annulment committees shows that each does little or 
nothing to restrain tribunals from interpreting the governing law in 
idiosyncratic or even incorrect ways.
In some early annulment decisions – the so-called “first generation”, 
comprising Klöckner v Cameroon I31 and Amco v Indonesia I32 – the 
annulment committees closely scrutinized the tribunals’ interpretation 
of the governing law and application of that law to the facts of the 
dispute, reasoning that a failure to accurately apply the governing law can 
constitute either (or both) an excess of powers or a failure to state reasons.33 
However, both annulment committees were heavily criticized for these 
decisions.34 The modern annulment decisions, and the overwhelming 
weight of commentary, hold that tribunals only manifestly exceed their 
powers related to application of the governing law if they fail to apply 
the chosen law altogether or blatantly apply a different law.35 If a tribunal 
defectively or incompetently applies the chosen law, the award is proof 
from annulment. Similarly, the modern position is that a tribunal has 
failed to give reasons only where the annulment committee is unable to 
follow the tribunal’s reasoning or see how it relates to the issues before 
31. Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of 
Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais II (1985), ICSID Case No 
ARB/81/2, 2 ICSID Reports 95 [Klöckner I].
32. Amco Asia Co and others v Republic of Indonesia (1986), ICSID Case No 
ARB/81/1, 1 ICSID Reports 509 [Amco I]. 
33. See Christoph Schreuer, “Three Generations of ICSID Annulment 
Proceedings” in Emanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, eds, Annulment of 
ICSID Awards, IAI International Arbitration Series No 1 (New York: 
Juris, 2004) at 17.
34. Vladimír Balaš, “Review of Awards” in Peter Muchlinski et al, eds, Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) at 1148-49.
35. See e.g. Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn BHD v Malaysia (2007) ICSID 
Case No ARB/05/10. The decision of the annulment committee criticizes 
the award’s failure to examine the express terms of the IIA as applicable 
law, and instead to decide on the basis of default rules in the ICSID 
Convention. The annulment committee held that such failure constituted 
a manifest excess of powers requiring annulment under the ICSID 
Convention. Ibid at para 80.
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the tribunal.36 Whether the reasons given by the tribunal are correct, 
adequate, or convincing is irrelevant.37
In sum, there are only two obligations related to application of the 
governing law that are directly imposed upon ISA tribunals by positive 
law: that arbitrators may not refuse to apply the law on the grounds that 
it is silent or obscure, and that arbitrators must give some reasons for 
their decision. Neither mandates that the tribunal interpret the law in 
any particular way. Even if one were to follow the now-discredited first 
generation of annulment decisions and find that a failure to accurately 
apply the governing law can constitute a manifest excess of powers, the 
powers referred to are those granted by the arbitration agreement. We 
must therefore look to the arbitration agreement to find any constraints 
on the tribunal’s power to apply the law.
What is meant by the arbitration agreement in this context is the 
provision in the relevant IIA that expresses a contracting state’s consent 
to arbitrate, if an investor from another contracting state initiates 
arbitration. The term “parties” is not defined in the ICSID Convention, 
but it is clear from the context that the term refers to the parties to the 
dispute (i.e. the host state and the investor), rather than the parties to 
the IIA (i.e. the two or more states that ratified it).38 Throughout the 
ICSID Convention, states involved in ISAs are referred to as “Contracting 
36. The “second generation” of annulment decisions emphasized this point. 
See e.g. Maritime International Nominees Establishment v Republic of 
Guinea (1988), ICSID Case No ARB/84/4, Klöckner I, supra note 31 and 
Amco I, supra note 32. 
37. The “third generation” of annulment decisions repeatedly affirmed this 
point. See e.g. Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt (2002), ICSID 
Case No ARB/98/4; Empresas Lucchetti SA and Lucchetti of Peru SA v 
The Republic of Peru (2007), ICSID Case No ARB/03/4; and CMS Gas 
Transmission Co v The Republic of Argentina (2007), ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/8. 
38. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of 
the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, ICSID Convention, 





Karton, Law and Interpretive Authority in Investor-State Arbitration
States”, whereas “parties” always refers to the parties to the dispute, rather 
than the parties to the IIA. 
It may therefore seem that investors, as parties to a dispute, have the 
power to shape the governing law. Indeed they may, but only if the host 
state agrees. A host state’s offer to arbitrate, as expressed in the dispute 
resolution provisions of the IIA, is a conditional offer – conditional on 
the investor’s acceptance of the terms of the IIA’s arbitration agreement. 
Nothing prevents a state and investor from making a subsequent 
agreement as to the choice of law; Article 42 of the ICSID Convention 
does not require that the parties make a choice of law at any particular 
time or in any particular form in order for that choice to bind the 
tribunal. However, unless the host state and the investor agree to law 
other than one stated in the IIA, the choice of law in the IIA binds the 
tribunal. In practice, although other laws (in particular domestic laws 
of the respondent states) are frequently applied to other aspects of an 
investor-state dispute, the content of the obligations created by the IIA is 
almost invariably determined according to the law specified in the choice 
of law provision of the IIA, if there is one.
The contractarian structure of arbitral authority in ISA thus renders 
fatuous arguments about whether investment arbitrators are agents of 
the parties or trustees of the treaty regime. International relations theory 
classically distinguishes between third party adjudicators who are agents 
of contracting states versus those who are trustees of the underlying 
regime.39 The distinction is not binary; agent and trustee are opposing 
ends of a spectrum.40 Where a particular adjudicative body sits within 
that spectrum depends primarily on the “zone of discretion” delegated 
to the adjudicative body by states parties to the treaty empowering the 
39. Kurtz, supra note 8 at 267 (citing Karen Alter, “Agent or Trustee: 
International Courts in their Political Context” (2008) 14:1 European 
Journal of International Relations 33l and Jean-Jacques Laffont & 
David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal – Agent Model 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)). 
40. Anthea Roberts, “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
the Dual Role of States” (2010) 104 American Journal of International 
Law 179 at 187 [Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”].
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tribunal.41 The breadth of the zone of discretion is determined by the 
sum of competences explicitly delegated to an adjudicator minus the 
sum of control instruments available for use by principals to curb their 
operations.42 Tribunals acting within a large zone of discretion act in a 
“permissive strategic environment as trustees of the values that inhere in 
the treaties that constituted them” and can “shape or control the evolution 
of the [treaty] regime”.43 Tribunals acting as agents, by contrast, must 
“align their adjudicatory activities far more closely with the immediate 
preferences” of their principals.44
To determine where ISA tribunals sit along that spectrum, one must 
examine the structural features of the system, in particular the “systems 
of control” within ISA.45 Arbitral jurisdiction is limited to the specific 
set of disputes described in the arbitration provisions of IIAs. Arbitrators 
have no life tenure and are appointed ad hoc for each dispute; they are 
therefore vulnerable to retaliation for their decisions. Arbitral awards may 
be overturned, albeit on narrow grounds, and more generally may be 
overridden by the renegotiation of IIAs. States therefore possess a number 
of control powers that constrain the authority of investment arbitrators, 
suggesting that states parties expect arbitrators to exercise their authority 
closely in line with the states parties’ objectives.46 
Indeed, the only important aspect of ISA tribunals consistent with a 
41. Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L Brunell, “Trustee Courts and the 
Judicialization of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian 
Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European 
Union and the World Trade Organization” (2013) 1 Journal of Law and 
Courts 61 at 65.
42. Ibid; For an alternative formulation, see Roberts, “Power and Persuasion, 
supra note 40 at 185 (the scope of adjudicators’ zone of discretion is 
defined by “the interpretive powers explicitly or implicitly delegated to 
them minus the formal and informal powers retained by treaty parties to 
influence their interpretations, including through dialogue” at 185).
43. Kurtz, supra note 8 at 267.
44. Ibid at 268.
45. See generally W Michael Reisman, Systems of Control in International 
Adjudication and Arbitration: Breakdown and Repair (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1992).
46. Kurtz, supra note 8 at 268-69.
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trustee type of role (beyond the simple fact that they may issue decisions 
that are binding on states) is the degree of interpretive authority that 
is typically delegated to arbitrators. Writes Roberts, investment treaties 
involve: 
a low level of precision, because the commitments themselves are broad and 
vague (e.g. the promise to treat investors fairly and equitably). Although 
imprecision is normally associated with state discretion, when it is coupled 
with a high degree of obligation and delegation, the opposite is true: the 
body charged with interpreting and applying the standard is afforded wide 
discretion. 47
The net result is a significant shift of interpretive power from the 
treaty parties to ISA tribunals. The vague, standard-like substantive 
obligations contained in IIAs represent a greater degree of delegation to 
adjudicators than would be entailed by more precise, rule-like normative 
prescriptions.48
Nevertheless, while such delegation may be broad in a given 
arbitration, it is entirely contingent upon the language of the particular 
IIA, whose substantive previsions may be vague or precise. Either way, 
the tribunal’s authority is entirely circumscribed. Unlike many matters 
relating to ISDS therefore, it is unarguable that arbitrators can only ever 
be agents of the states parties to the IIA. Given the radical decentralization 
of the ISDS system,49 there is not even a treaty regime for them to be 
trustees of in the way that, for example the European Court of Human 
Rights is charged with developing, maintaining and, furthering the goals 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. Beyond treaty regimes, 
ISA tribunals have no inherent obligation to “international law”, “civil 
society”, or any other such abstraction. They have only the power and 
duty to resolve the individual disputes for which they are constituted by 
interpreting and applying the law chosen by the parties, in the manner 
and according to the procedures that the parties direct.
This is not to say that arbitrators are merely agents of the states 
47. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, supra note 40 at 190 [citations omitted].
48. Kenneth W Abbott et al, “The Concept of Legalization” (2000) 54:3 
International Organization 401 at 413.
49. Mortenson, supra note 15 at 11.
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party to the IIA and nothing else. At minimum, a tribunal’s authority 
“derives from both the general grant of power by the treaty parties and 
the specific invocation of that grant by an investor of one treaty party 
(as claimant) against another treaty party (as respondent)”.50 This is the 
“signal innovation” of modern IIAs, and their defining feature – that 
they provide a direct remedy for individual investors against states, 
without any intermediation.51 More concretely, the investor also has a 
role in appointing the members of the tribunal, which means that states 
“play a lesser role in determining the appointment and reappointment of 
investment arbitrators compared to most international judges”. 52 
However, the investor normally plays no role in shaping the 
tribunal’s interpretive authority. Writes Roberts, “Investment tribunals 
cannot be viewed only as agents of the disputing parties because the 
disputing parties’ rights and the investment tribunal’s powers are defined 
and delimited by the treaty’s grant of power”.53 Accordingly, in exercising 
their power to interpret and apply the governing law – to decide the 
merits of disputes – ISA tribunals should act as if they were agents of the 
states parties alone.
IV. Interpretation of the Governing Law in 
Investment Treaty Arbitrations
ISA tribunals derive neither their power to apply the law nor their duties 
associated with the exercise of that power from the general law. Within 
the set of public international law dispute resolution institutions, those 
that are arbitral in character must be sharply distinguished from those that 
derive their authority in other ways, in particular the “standing” courts 
such as the ICJ and the World Trade Organization Appellate Body. No 
treaty regime empowers arbitral tribunals; even IIAs only provide for the 
establishment of tribunals if and when an investor makes a claim against 
50. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, supra note 40 at 182.
51. Mortenson, supra note 15 at 2.
52. Anthea Roberts, “Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping 
the Investment Treaty System” (2013) 107:1 American Journal of 
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an individual state. Except to the extent that positive law imposes non-
derogable duties upon the tribunal (such as a duty to declare conflicts of 
interest, not to take bribes, or, more prosaically, to provide reasons for 
their decision), tribunals owe only those duties that the parties impose 
and owe performance of those duties only to the parties. 
The structure of interpretive authority in ISA has not been 
fundamentally altered by its transposition from the international 
commercial arbitration context to public international law disputes and 
“triangular” ISA. There is an arbitration agreement (the dispute resolution 
provisions of the IIA); there are parties to that arbitration agreement (the 
states that enacted the IIA); there are chosen procedures (the ICSID 
Convention and Rules, the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Rules, 
or whatever other combination the parties select); finally, there is a choice 
of the rules of law according to which the tribunal must decide the merits 
of the dispute: the choice of law provision in the IIA, potentially modified 
by other agreements between the host state and the investor. If there is 
no choice of law, this should be taken as an implied choice of the default 
law, such as that mandated by the second sentence of Article 42(1) of 
the ICSID Convention, or alternatively as a delegation to the tribunal of 
the power to choose the applicable law. One way or another, there will 
be an identifiable set of rules of law that the tribunal must apply, save 
only the rare circumstance where the parties have chosen ex aequo et bono 
determination.
To make these generalities more concrete, consider the question of 
whether tribunals have a duty to decide consistently with prior tribunals. 
The Saipem tribunal thought so; it found that it had a “duty to seek 
to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law”.54 On 
the other hand, the Romak tribunal held that, “Ultimately, the Arbitral 
Tribunal has not been entrusted, by the Parties or otherwise, with a mission 
54. Saipem SpA v The People’s Republic of Bangladesh (2009), ICSID Case No 
ARB/05/07, at para 90 [Saipem].
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to ensure the coherence or development of ‘arbitral jurisprudence’”.55 The 
point here is not so much that Saipem was wrongly decided and Romak 
was correct on the point that motivated these observation: how tribunals 
should treat precedents.56 Rather, the point is that the Saipem tribunal 
was asking the wrong question – how should tribunals conceive of their 
role? – while the Romak tribunal was asking the right one – what role 
have the parties assigned to the tribunal?
Therefore, nearly all questions of the applicable law – how it is 
chosen, how its content is ascertained, and how it is applied to the facts – 
are at heart matters of interpretation. The tribunal should determine the 
intentions of the parties as expressed in the relevant agreements and, where 
those agreements do not provide a clear answer, should act according to 
the parties’ presumed intentions. Applying rules beyond those the parties 
agreed to or in a manner not agreed to by the parties constitutes an excess 
of authority, which, if “manifest”, constitutes grounds for annulment of 
the tribunal’s award.
What laws do current IIAs call for? Most contain no choice of 
55. Romak SA (Switzerland) v The Republic of Uzbekistan (2009), UNCITRAL 
PCA Case No AA280 at para 171 [Romak]; see also AES Corporation v 
The Argentine Republic (2005), ICSID Case No ARB/02/17 (concluding 
that “[e]ach tribunal remains sovereign and may retain, as it is confirmed 
by ICSID practice, a different solution for resolving the same problem” at 
paras 30-31).
56. The status of precedents in ISA is outside the scope of this article, but 
it is worth mentioning that citation of precedent is consistent with the 
structural argument advanced in this article. However, precedents are 
relevant not because tribunals have some obligation to decide consistently 
with each other or to advance the development of IIL. Rather, “judicial 
decisions” constitute a source of international law under the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice (albeit as “subsidiary means”) for 
determining the content of international law. Therefore, even under a 
narrow, orthodox definition of the sources of international law, precedents 
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law provision whatsoever.57 For ICSID arbitrations, that leads to the 
application of the residual rule of Article 42(1), which calls for the host 
state’s law and the applicable rules of international law. For non-ICSID 
arbitrations, this generally means that the parties to the dispute may agree 
to the governing law or, failing such agreement, the tribunal chooses.58
Among the IIAs that contain choice of law provisions, the wording 
varies. However, the choice of law provisions fall into six categories.59 
The most common type of clause calls for the application of four 
sources of legal rules: the IIA itself, the municipal law of the host state, 
the provisions of any investment agreement or contract relating to the 
investment, and applicable principles of international law. The second 
type of choice of law clause is similar in that it lists various sources of law, 
but it provides the tribunal should “take [these sources] into account”, as 
opposed to applying them, and may also provide that the list of sources 
is non-exhaustive. The third type calls for application of the IIA itself and 
international law. The fourth type is found in Indian BIT practice, and 
calls for application of the treaty text alone.60 The fifth type, which appears 
only in more recent treaties and goes into more detail as to the relevant 
sources of law, specifies different laws to apply to different matters. For 
example, it might specify that the IIA text and international law apply 
57. Christoph Schreuer, “Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration” (2014) 1:1 McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution 1 at 
12.
58. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules GA Res 68/109, UNCITRAL, 2013, 
UN Doc A/68/462 art 35(1) (most non-ICSID ISAs are conducted 
under the UNCITRAL Rules, which determine the applicable law in this 
manner).
59. Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2009) 
at 78. See generally Hege Elisabeth Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor-
State Arbitration: The Interplay Between National and International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
60. Ibid at 80 (It also provides that arbitrations may be submitted only to 
ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, and not to ICSID, 
presumably to avoid Article 42(1), second sentence, ICSID Convention, 
which provides a backup choice of law that includes reference to 
international law).
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to claims relating to breaches of treaty obligations, but that claims 
relating to investment authorizations are governed by the law specified 
in the authorization or, failing that, a combination of the law of the 
host state, the IIA text, and international law.61 Finally, the sixth category 
of choice of law provisions may contain similar language to any of the 
previous types, but then adds that an interpretation of an IIA provision 
made jointly by the contracting states is binding on a tribunal.62 These 
provisions vary between IIAs as to matters like the time limit for issuance 
of a joint interpretation and whether the tribunal must, if so requested by 
a state party, ask for a joint interpretation.
The apparent variety between IIAS does not, in the end, make much 
of a difference. “The only significant difference between the various rules 
on applicable law in treaties lies in the absence of a reference to host 
state law in some of them. The narrower clauses refer only to the treaty 
itself and to applicable rules of international law”. 63 More generally, the 
default rule under Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention captures most if 
not all elements contained in the more elaborate choice of law provisions 
in some IIAs. What all of these categories, except the last one, have in 
common is that they do not make any attempt to guide the tribunal’s 
ascertainment or application of the chosen law; all they do is make an 
exclusive or non-exclusive list of the laws tribunals must consider. 
The only exception to this pattern is the choice of law provisions 
that call for joint interpretations of the IIA by the states party to it. These 
do have the potential to significantly affect outcomes; however, as will 
be discussed below, states have the power to shape treaty interpretation 
61. See e.g. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, 5 August 2004, 32 ILM (entered into force 1 March 2006).
62. See North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of 
Canada, the Government of Mexico, and the Government of the United 
States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2 (entered into force 1 
January 1994) [NAFTA] (NAFTA Chapter 11 is probably the most 
prominent example. Article 1131(2) provides that tribunals are bound 
by interpretations of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, a joint body 
composed of representatives of the three NAFTA contracting states: 
Canada, the USA, and Mexico).
63. Schreuer, supra note 57 at 12-13.
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through subsequent agreements and subsequent practice, regardless of 
whether the treaty contains a specific provision calling for binding joint 
interpretations.64 Except for clauses relating to joint interpretations, 
IIAs typically give no guidance as to how the applicable law ought to be 
interpreted, nor does the default choice of law provision in the ICSID 
Convention. I call choice of law clauses of this standard kind “unqualified” 
choices of national or international law.65
How should tribunals proceed when faced with an unqualified 
choice of national or international law? Such a choice of law provision 
leaves unspecified a number of issues relating to interpretation of that 
law, such as how its rules are to be ascertained, whether reference may be 
made to other laws or to general principles, and how conflicts are to be 
resolved between these different sources of rules of law (i.e. which norms 
take precedence in case of conflicts). 
Since the choice of law clause constitutes an agreement of the parties 
to the arbitration agreement, these questions should themselves be 
answered by reference to a set of interpretive principles. Unfortunately, 
in most cases involving unqualified choices of law, neither the text of the 
IIA nor any of the other means of interpretation prescribed by Articles 
31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties66 (“VCLT”) (such 
as an examination of the IIA’s travaux) sheds any light. The tribunal’s only 
safe option is to presume that, unless the parties carve out some area of 
the law or qualify the choice of law in some other way, choice of a legal 
system means a choice of all of that legal system’s substantive rules.
With respect to national laws applied by ISA tribunals (for example, 
to determine whether the host state violated the terms of an investment 
authorization or investment contract governed by national law) this 
means applying all of the various sources of law recognized as valid within 
64. See infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
65. One sees the same thing in contract drafting practice, where most choice 
of law clauses simply name the law of some state without qualification. 
See Joshua Karton, “The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation” 
(2015) 6:1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1 at 27-30.
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
arts 31-32 (entered into force 27 January 1980) [VCLT].
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the chosen national legal system – not just relevant code provisions, but 
also to all relevant statutes and regulations, along with case law and 
customs recognized as authoritative within the named legal system.67 
Since all state laws exist within a normative hierarchy that national 
courts would unhesitatingly apply (although they may disagree on the 
outcomes in individual cases), ISA tribunals should also take into account 
the relationship between the various national rules of law, including 
constitutional norms that might invalidate some other rule of law.68 As a 
corollary, for matters governed by national law, the chosen national law 
should be applied to the exclusion of any other national or transnational 
laws; when parties select a single state’s law, they presumably intend that 
no other national laws should be applied.
With respect to international law, it means roughly the same thing: 
ISA tribunals should apply international law as a whole, not just rules 
developed in the investment context, and recognize supervening principles 
of public international law, such as ius cogens or rules of international 
human rights law, that may have priority over the investment treaty.
In all this, it is the intentions of the state parties to the investment 
treaty that matter, rather than the intentions of the parties to the dispute 
(i.e. the investor and the host state). Investment arbitrators are agents of 
67. This specification is made in some IIAs; see US, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(2012), online: <ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20
ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> (defines national law as “the law that a domestic 
court or tribunal of proper jurisdiction would apply in the same case” 
at 34, n 22. Without further specification, this must be taken to mean 
that the tribunal should situate itself in the position of a domestic court, 
consulting whatever sources of law are authoritative in that state in 
whatever hierarchy would be observed within that state) [US Model BIT].
68. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, ILC 2001 A/56/10, art 
3 (this is qualified by the principle that states may not plead conformity 
with their own municipal laws to excuse a violations of their international 
law obligations; “the characterization of an act of a State as internationally 
wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not 
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the treaty parties, not the disputing parties.
This rather bald statement will be instinctively rejected by many in 
the ISA community, who see the system of investment treaties as designed 
in large part to protect the legitimate expectations of investors. Therefore, 
two immediate qualifications are required. First, I do not mean to say 
that the legitimate expectations of investors are never relevant. They may 
matter greatly in a variety of circumstances, especially for issues that turn 
on the investment contract that the investor signed. In addition, the fact 
that some act of the host state was contrary to previous representations 
by the state to the investor – representations that gave rise to legitimate 
expectations by the investor that the state would follow through on those 
representations – may mean that the action constituted a treaty breach, 
specifically the fair and equitable treatment standard contained in most 
IIAs.69 Recent treaty practice adopts this vision of legitimate expectations. 
For example, the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (“CETA”) provides:
When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, a Tribunal 
may take into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an 
investor to induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, 
and upon which the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the 
covered investment, but that the Party subsequently frustrated.70
But the expectations of the investor cannot be applied to shape the 
meaning of treaty obligations themselves: the choice of law in the IIA 
constitutes a condition of the host state’s standing offer to arbitrate, and 
investors accept that offer when they launch an arbitration under the IIA.
The second qualification is that the power of the state parties to the 
69. A consistent line of case law, especially under NAFTA Chapter 11, 
embraces this point of view. See William Ralph Clayton, William Richard 
Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc v 
Government of Canada (2009), UNCITRAL PCA Case No 2009-04 at 
para 589; Mobil Investments Canada Inc & Murphy Oil Corporation v 
Canada (2012) ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/4 at para 152; Glamis Gold 
Ltd v United States of America (2009), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules at 
para 22; Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States (2004), ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, at paras 98-99.
70. 30 October 2016, art 8.10(4) (not yet entered into force) [CETA].
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IIA to shape the tribunal’s interpretation and application of the IIA does 
not imply a requirement to interpret IIAs in a manner favourable to the 
host state in any given dispute. States enact IIAs in order to create a 
fair and predictable climate for foreign investments, with the ultimate 
(and sometimes directly expressed) goal of increasing FDI flows. In 
order to achieve those objectives, IIAs grant rights directly to investors, 
rights would be largely meaningless if states did not delegate to neutral 
and independent arbitral tribunals the power to enforce those rights.71 
Accordingly, some state conduct harmful to investors, even if conducted 
for a legitimate regulatory purpose, can and should be held to violate 
state obligations under the IIA and to give rise to an obligation to pay 
compensatory damages.
These qualifications aside, the contractarian structure of arbitral 
authority in ISA means that states effectively control the interpretive 
process. They are, to use the memorable phrase of Methymaki and 
Tzanakopoulos, “masters of puppets”.72
V. Implications of the Proposed Approach
In this Part, I explain how the abstract points made in Part III apply 
to the interpretation of IIAs by arbitral tribunals. The most direct 
consequence of my focus on choice of law is that states have the ultimate 
power not only to choose the governing substantive rules of law, but also 
to direct their interpretation. This Part first describes how states can make 
use of that power to bind ISA tribunals to interpret IIAs in particular 
ways. Next, it explains how tribunals should interpret IIAs under the 
commonly-employed choice of law provisions that currently exist in IIAs.
71. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, supra note 40 at 183.
72. Eleni Methymaki & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, “Masters of Puppets? 
Reassertion of Control through Joint Investment Treaty Interpretation” 
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A. States in the Driver’s Seat
In the last few years, a number of states have pursued a number of 
strategies in an effort to “reassert control” over ISAs.73 Some have 
“exited” the ISDS system by withdrawing from the ICSID Convention 
or from individual treaties they view as problematic, or by not renewing 
investment treaties when they expire.74 More often, states have attempted 
to renegotiate the terms of existing treaties or draft new terms for treaties 
going forward. Leaving aside treaty terms that would change the structure 
of the ISDS system,75 states have generally adopted one of two strategies: 
defining substantive obligations more narrowly and precisely than in past 
IIAs, and carving out specific exceptions to state liability in areas such 
as taxation, financial services, public health and the environment, and 
culture.76 Taken together, these strategies suggest that states in general 
desire greater detail in investment treaties, with the aim of constraining 
arbitral discretion and promoting greater certainty.77
Despite some notable diplomatic successes, such as the conclusion 
of CETA, these efforts have been somewhat underwhelming. Some 
redrafting attempts fail on their own terms to introduce greater precision 
73. See Andreas Kulik, ed, Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty 
Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2017).
74. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, supra note 40 at 191.
75. See European Commission, “Fact Sheet on Investment Provisions in 
the EU-Canada free trade agreement (CETA)” (February 2016), online: 
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf> 
(such as the EU’s proposal for a permanent investment court, which has 
been incorporated into the recently-concluded CETA).
76. Mitchell Moranis, “Between power and procedure: the changing balance 
of investment treaty protections” (2015) 32:1 Arbitration International 81 
at 83.
77. Ibid at 101.
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and predictability.78 But no matter how detailed and specific treaty 
language becomes, it can never resolve all questions as to the content of 
obligations arising under the treaty. There are two reasons for this, first, 
all treaty language, no matter how apparently clear, must be interpreted. 
As former President of the ICJ, Dame Rosalyn Higgins put it: 
Reference to the ‘correct legal view’ or ‘rules’ can never avoid the element 
of choice (though it can seek to disguise it), nor can it provide guidance 
to the preferable decision. In making this choice one must inevitably have 
consideration for the humanitarian, moral, and social purposes of the law.79 
Second, not all potential areas of dispute can possibly be predicted at the 
time an IIA is negotiated or renegotiated. There will always be unforeseen 
gaps. 
In other words, attempting to eliminate interpretive uncertainty ex 
ante by drafting more specific treaties is ultimately a doomed enterprise, 
based on a misunderstanding of how law works. Treaty text is never: 
… reducible to a fixed, immutable expression of the rule … the engagement of 
actors with a legal text is historically contingent: it is structured by the frame 
in which it is situated, and it is measured against rules contained within that 
frame, not to mention the past practices of other actors or disputants.80 
As Schwebel writes of the EU’s attempts to reassert control by redrafting 
treaty provisions with greater precision: 
There is … a troubling message throughout the EU’s [proposals] … the 
notion that international law is simply a set of rules to be applied by judges 
mechanically. Under this view, the more the [treaty] text clarifies what the law 
is, the less doubt will exist, the more rigorous and consistent the analysis of 
78. Federico Ortino, “Refining the Content and Role of Investment ‘Rules’ 
and ‘Standards’: A New Approach to International Investment Treaty 
Making” (2013) 28 ICSID Rev 152 at 158; but see Moranis, ibid 
(arguing that “States are beginning to fill the gaps in treaties, providing 
greater detail and setting clear limits to their obligations and investors’ 
rights” at 83).
79. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 5.
80. Hernandez, supra note 6 at 171 citing Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation 
Makes International Law: Between Normative Twists and Semantic Authority 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 49.
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TTIP awards will be.81 
This view is at best misguided and at worst wilfully obtuse. As Schwebel 
concludes, “[t]he fact is that applying rules always involves a certain 
degree of choice”.82
A potentially more fruitful approach, adopted by some states but 
still significantly underused, is to promulgate interpretations of treaties 
ex post.83 As discussed above, some IIAs expressly provide that the states 
parties may jointly issue interpretations of a treaty that are binding upon 
tribunals. But even where no such provision exists, first principles dictate 
that states, acting together, are masters of the treaties they make: 
ultimately the power of authoritative interpretation of a norm … rests with 
the organ which promulgated the norm and which has the power to revoke it. 
In the context of a treaty, the organ that has this power is the peculiar organ 
formed by all the states parties to it.84 
When states agree on an authentic interpretation of the treaty, it has both 
retroactive and prospective effect: “[w]e are in the realm of the lawmaker 
restricting the range of possible meanings of a norm once and for all, by 
selecting one of them to control indefinitely, rather than selecting one 
among them to apply to a specific case”.85 Thus, the only legal effect of 
an IIA provision regulating joint interpretations is potentially to limit 
the scope of states’ power to issue joint interpretations, for example by 
imposing temporal limits or by requiring that the joint interpretations 
81. Stephen M Schwebel, “The Outlook for the Continued Vitality, or 
Lack Thereof, of Investor-State Arbitration” (2016) 32:1 Arbitration 
International 1 at 7.
82. Ibid at 8.
83. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, supra note 40 at 179.
84. Methymaki, supra note 72 at 5 citing Question of Jaworzina (Polish-
Czechoslovakian Frontier) (Advisory Opinion) [1923] PCIJ Ser B No 8, 
37: (“the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule 
belongs solely to the person or body who has the power to modify or 
suppress it” at 5) [emphasis in original].
85. Ibid at 5 [emphasis in original].
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take a particular form or be arrived at through a particular process.86 
This conclusion is confirmed by customary international law 
principles of interpretation, as recognized by tribunals going back 
more than a century. In 1911, the US-Mexico International Boundary 
Commission in The Chamizal Case87 found that joint interpretations 
were not only binding on the tribunal, but indeed also on the parties to 
the treaty. The Commission found it:
impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the two nations have, by 
their subsequent treaties and their consistent course of conduct in connection 
with all cases arising thereunder, put such an authoritative interpretation upon 
the language of the treaties of 1848 and 1853 as to preclude them from now 
contending that the fluvial portion of the boundary created by those treaties is 
a fixed line boundary.88
The binding force of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice 
of the parties is also codified in the VCLT, which expresses customary 
principles of interpretation. Article 31(1) requires that treaties be 
interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object 
and purpose”.89 At a minimum, joint interpretations of a treaty by the 
states party to it form part of that context, and are therefore relevant to 
all matters of interpretation. But in addition, paragraph 3 of Article 31 
provides expressly that, together with the treaty’s context, interpreters 
must also take into account:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice 
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law 
86. See NAFTA, supra note 62 (Chapter 11, art 1131(2) provides that 
interpretations of the NAFTA Free Trade Commissions are binding upon 
tribunals, and art 1132, which provides that disputing parties may require 
tribunals to request from the Free Trade Commission interpretations on 
the scope of a reservation or exception set out in one of the annexes to 
Chapter 11).
87. (1911), XI RIAA 309. 
88. Ibid at 328.
89. VCLT, supra note 66, art 31(1) [emphasis added].
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applicable in the relations between the parties.90
The distinction in paragraph 3 between subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice makes no difference in terms of their legal effects, but 
only in terms of the necessary evidence; a subsequent agreement under 
subparagraph (a) constitutes “an ipso facto authentic interpretation”, while 
a party relying on subsequent practice under subparagraph (b) must show 
that the practice of the states parties substantiates a particular common 
understanding.91 If the states that are party to an IIA promulgate any kind 
of document setting out their understanding of the meaning of treaty 
terms, such document would qualify as both subsequent agreement and 
subsequent practice. Either way, writes Villiger, “the parties’ authentic 
interpretation of the treaty terms is not only particularly reliable, it is also 
endowed with binding force”.92 Here, I refer to subsequent agreements 
and subsequent practice that have the purpose and effect of specifying 
the meanings of treaty provisions collectively as “joint interpretations”.
Under the VCLT, states’ powers to issue joint interpretations are 
effectively unlimited. In the investment arbitration context, it has been 
argued that the direct rights that are vested in investors by IIAs may impose 
limits on the absolutely binding character of joint interpretations.93 
Investors may rely to their detriment on meanings of the applicable IIA 
as they are understood at the time the investment is made. In addition, 
a tension arises between states’ dual roles, as parties to the IIA and as 
respondents in individual arbitrations. Roberts explains:
Viewing investment treaty arbitration solely through a public international 
law, state-to-state prism is unsatisfactory because investment treaties create 
90. Ibid.
91. First Report of Special Rapporteur Georg Nolte, Subsequent Agreements 
and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation, ILC, 65th 
Sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/660 (2013) at para 70; see also Rahim Moloo, 
“When Actions Speak Louder Than Words: The Relevance of Subsequent 
Party Conduct to Treaty Interpretation” (2013) 31:1 Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 39 at 58 (describing subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice as existing along a single evidentiary continuum).
92. Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) at 429.
93. See Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, supra note 40 at 207-15.
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reciprocal rights and duties for the treaty parties and rights for nonstate actors 
(investors). To increase confidence in and enforcement of those rights, states 
have delegated the power to resolve investor-state disputes to arbitral tribunals. 
If the treaty parties could agree at any time on a binding interpretation of 
the treaty, they could use that authority to undermine not only investors’ 
expectations but also tribunals’ dispute resolution powers.94 
For this reason, Roberts and others argue that states’ power to issue joint 
interpretations of IIAs may be limited on two broad bases: reasonableness 
and timing. With respect to reasonableness, if a joint interpretation selects 
one of a set of reasonable interpretations of a disputed treaty provision, 
that is indisputably within the states parties’ power, but adoption of 
an unreasonable or unexpected interpretation may constitute a de facto 
amendment of the treaty, which would be unfair to the investor to apply 
retroactively. With respect to timing, changing the terms of the treaty 
after an investment is made may involve harm to investors who have 
detrimentally relied on the treaty; fixing the treaty’s terms after a claim is 
filed may harm not only the investor, but also the integrity of the arbitral 
process.95 For this reason, Roberts concludes that “the persuasiveness of 
treaty party interpretations should be understood as a function of their 
timing and reasonableness”.96
I reject limits based on reasonableness. States do indeed delegate to 
tribunals the power to interpret treaties, but that delegation is limited by 
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice. Writes Crawford: 
In the context of investment treaty arbitration there is a certain tendency to 
believe that investors own bilateral investment treaties, not the states parties to 
them … That is not what international law says. International law says that the 
parties to a treaty own the treaty and can interpret it. One might say within 
reason, but one might not question their application of reason as they see fit.97
The contractarian structure of authority in ISA means that investment 
arbitrators are, if anything, more bound by joint interpretations than 
94. Ibid at 183 [emphasis in original].
95. Ibid at 212.
96. Ibid. 
97. James Crawford, “A Consensualist Interpretation of Article 31(3) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” in Georg Nolte, ed, Treaties 
and Subsequent Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 29 at 31.
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adjudicators applying other kinds of treaties. A joint interpretation 
may be objectively unreasonable, but it is not within the power of ISA 
tribunals to declare it to be so. 
In addition, there should not be any temporal limit on states’ 
power to issue interpretations of treaties, unless a limit is imposed by 
the IIA itself or a legal stabilization clause in an investment agreement 
or other contract between the respondent state and the investor. Absent 
such a provision, investors have no legitimate expectation that the legal 
environment of their investment will remain stable for the entire life 
of that investment. Some recently-enacted treaties make this principle 
explicit. For example, CETA provides that, “[f ]or greater certainty, the 
mere fact that a Party regulates, including through a modification to its 
laws, in a manner which negatively affects an investment or interferes 
with an investor’s expectations, including its expectations of profits, does 
not amount to a breach of an obligation…”.98 In other words, states 
may regulate without fear that the mere fact that their regulations reduce 
foreign investors’ profits will lead to a finding that they have breached the 
treaty. Therefore, a fortiori states must be able to enter into subsequent 
agreements or establish subsequent practice in order to clarify or change 
the meaning of treaty obligations, even if this restricts the range of 
possible interpretations tribunals may adopt. 99
More importantly for present purposes, the choice of law provisions 
in IIAs or in the ICSID Convention state only that tribunals shall or 
may apply certain laws; they do nothing to fix the content of those 
laws in place. Accordingly, arbitrators are bound to apply the law as it 
stands at the time they render their decision. This arguably raises due 
process concerns, especially where states issue joint interpretations after 
a dispute arises. However, nothing about a change in the underlying law 
constitutes a procedural violation that might justify annulment of an 
award or refusal of enforcement. On the contrary – a tribunal’s failure to 
apply the governing law as authoritatively interpreted by the states party 
to the treaty would constitute an excess of powers. In addition, as the 
98. CETA, supra note 70, art 8.9(2).
99. Methymaki, supra note 72 at 19.
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investor’s home state has an opportunity to protect its investor by arguing 
that a subsequent agreement or practice alleged by the respondent states 
constitutes an impermissible moving of the goalposts. If it decides not to 
do so, that “must mean something”.100 It is therefore unfortunate that ISA 
tribunals tend toward “a certain reluctance … to embrace wholeheartedly 
… the unquestionable vesting with binding force of joint interpretations 
by the states parties of their own treaties”.101
The correct approach is demonstrated by a recent decision of the 
High Court of Singapore annulling an investor-state award in favour of 
a Macanese investor under the PRC-Laos BIT on the basis of excess of 
jurisdiction (“Sanum Investments”).102 The basis of the annulment was an 
exchange of letters between China and Laos, which reflected the common 
position of China and Laos that the BIT did not extend to Macau. The 
court held that the letters constituted a subsequent agreement of the 
states parties under Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, establishing conclusively that 
the Macanese investor could not take advantage of the BIT.103
It made no difference that exchange of letters came after the tribunal 
had issued its decision upholding its jurisdiction; the Singaporean court 
dismissed the investor’s due process concerns, reasoning that “parties 
relying on the provisions of BITs” should be aware of the potential impact 
of Article 31(3)(a). The letters reflected the “common understanding” of 
the parties rather than a retroactive amendment of the PRC-Laos BIT.104 
The Sanum Investments decision reflects the conception, advanced in this 
article, that while investors are third-party beneficiaries of IIAs and derive 
certain direct rights from them, investors have no claim to interpretive 
power over them.
These two avenues – redrafting of substantive IIA provisions and 
promulgation of binding interpretations after ratification of the IIA – have 
been employed by states and explored in the literature. The contractarian 
100. Ibid at 20.
101. Ibid at 15.
102. Government of the Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic v Sanum Investments 
Ltd [2015] SGHC 15 [Sanum Investments].
103. Ibid at paras 69-70.
104. Ibid at paras 76-77.
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theory advanced here points the way to a third strategy that, thus far, has 
been largely overlooked: states may shape the application of the governing 
law by adding content to the choice of law provisions in IIAs. For 
example, if states want arbitrators to follow or not to follow precedents, 
they can so provide in their treaties. The US Model BIT provides that “An 
award made by a tribunal shall have no binding force except between the 
disputing parties and in respect of the particular case”.105 This provision is 
modeled on Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, which has in no way prevented 
the ICJ from regularly treating its prior judgments as persuasive. Indeed, 
a de facto system of precedent has already existed in ISA for some time.106 
Thus, if tribunals are to be restrained from considering prior case law, the 
Model BIT should be redrafted accordingly; conversely, if the states party 
to the IIA want tribunals to take prior decisions into account, the clause 
can so state.
Similarly, if the states party to an IIA want to restrict the tribunal 
to certain international law doctrines and not others, it is within their 
power to do so. But even most recently-drafted treaties, including those 
promulgated by states intent on restricting arbitrators’ zone of discretion, 
do not take advantage of this opportunity. For example, Article 8.31(1) 
of CETA provides:
When rendering its decision, the Tribunal established under this Section shall 
apply this Agreement as interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, and other rules and principles of international law 
applicable between the Parties.107
Such a provision is effectively meaningless – a missed opportunity. The 
105. US Model BIT, supra note 67, art 34(4). 
106. See e.g. Eric De Brabandere, “Arbitral Decisions as a Source of 
International Investment Law” in Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere, 
eds, International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) at 245; Lucy Reed, “The De Facto 
Precedent Regime in Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive 
Case Management” (2010) 25:1 ICSID Rev 95; Andrea Bjorklund, 
“Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante” in 
Colin Picker et al, eds, International Economic Law: The State and Future 
of the Discipline (London: Bloomsbury, 2008) at 265.
107. CETA, supra note 70, art 8.31(1).
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VCLT already applies (as treaty law and as an expression of customary 
international law) to the interpretation of all IIAs except the small 
minority that do not take the form of treaties. Stating that tribunals 
should apply “other rules and principles of international law applicable 
between the Parties” does nothing to constrain arbitrators’ authority to 
determine which rules and principles are applicable.108 Despite all its 
verbiage, it is no different from a simple choice of “international law”.
States easily provide that particular treaties or areas of international 
law outside of the IIA text do or do not apply. They could contract out 
of the interpretive rules in the VCLT. They could even provide that 
interpretations other than those of the states parties are binding. For 
example, the choice of law provision in the IIA could declare opinions of 
the International Law Commission are binding. Such a provision could 
be accompanied by treaty language to the effect that failure to abide by 
reports of the ILC would constitute manifest excess of the tribunal’s 
powers, so that awards could be annulled or refused enforcement. (Note 
that I am not arguing that this would necessarily be a good idea, only that 
it would be effective.) 
The upshot is not that any particular interpretive approach is 
optimal, or even that any one approach can be considered optimal for all 
combinations of states parties. It is simply to encourage treaty drafters to 
be more creative and more assertive in shaping the interpretive authority 
of arbitrators beyond simply making unqualified choices of whole legal 
systems. Given the contractarian structure of interpretive authority in 
ISA, arbitrators would be bound by more specific choice of law provisions.
B. In Most Cases, International Investment Agreements 
Should be Interpreted Extensively
The previous section considered the ways in which states might act to 
take advantage of the contractarian structure of arbitral authority in ISA. 
But renegotiating treaties takes a great deal of time, and in the current 
108. See Schwebel, supra note 81 at 8-9 (arguing that, by contrast, the 
CETA text is probably overzealous in its attempts to restrain tribunals’ 
interpretations of national laws and regulations).
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political climate there may be little support for new multilateral or bilateral 
IIAs. Even if the political will existed and the collective action problems 
could be overcome, the transaction costs involved in renegotiating the 
thousands of extant treaties would be prohibitive.109 Even issuance of 
joint interpretations requires agreement between states with potentially 
opposed interests, as well as timely coordination between the states.
In the meantime, arbitrations continue to be commenced and 
tribunals must resolve them. To do so, they will have to interpret the 
IIAs that now exist. The contractarian structure of interpretive authority 
in ISA indicates that, in doing so, they should be guided by the choice 
of law provisions in those IIAs. As discussed above, most IIAs make, in 
effect, an unqualified choice of “international law” as the governing law. 
How should a tribunal interpret an IIA subject to such an unqualified 
choice of international law? This section sets out some brief rules of 
thumb as to how tribunals should proceed in this, the most common 
choice of law scenario under existing IIAs.
I argue that an unqualified choice of international law implies three 
more specific choices, all of which reflect the presumptive intention of the 
states party to the IIA as to how the IIA should be interpreted. First, (and 
least controversial) it constitutes a choice of international law rules of 
interpretation, as expressed in the VCLT. Second, it constitutes a choice 
of all international law, including customary and treaty law from outside 
the IIA and outside the IIL context – at a minimum, all of the sources 
of law envisaged by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. Third, it constitutes 
a choice of only international law – which means, for example, that 
tribunals have no power to conduct a comparative public law analysis 
to determine the meaning of treaty obligations.110 Regardless of whether 
a comparative public law analysis would increase the real or perceived 
legitimacy of ISA, it is outside the arbitral remit. 
In what follows, I will discuss these three points in more detail. In 
the process, I will show how an unqualified choice of international law 
109. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, supra note 40 at 192.
110. As urged by commentators such as Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 4; 
see Roberts, “Power and Persuasion”, ibid; see also note 4, supra, and 
accompanying text.
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as the governing law mandates an extensive approach to interpretation – 
one that draws on sources of international law beyond the treaty text and 
that gives voice to the object and purpose of the treaty.
It is undisputed that international law rules of interpretation as 
expressed in Articles 31-32 of the VCLT apply to the interpretation 
of IIAs,111 although tribunals are inconsistent in how they apply those 
rules and may pay mere lip service to the VCLT.112 What remains more 
contested is the role of international law beyond the VCLT in interpreting 
IIAs and filling gaps within them. This is the question of restrictive versus 
extensive interpretation, which lies at the heart of interpretive disputes 
in many areas of international law adjudication: whether treaties such as 
IIAs should be interpreted restrictively, according to the literal meaning 
of their text and in isolation from broader international law except where 
necessary to fill gaps, or extensively, with broad reference to the treaties’ 
object and purpose and to international law more generally. 
Given the incomplete nature of most IIAs, including the recently-
negotiated ones, some resort to international law beyond the IIA is 
unavoidable and uncontroversial. A good example is the customary 
international law rules on attribution described by the International 
Law Commission in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries.113 These are frequently 
111. J Romesh Weeramantry, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 24-30.
112. Ibid at 157-64 (observing that, while declaring that they would apply 
the VCLT, tribunals often rely instead on fairness, policy implications, 
practical consequences, efficiency, or reasonableness); see also Mahnoosh 
H Arsanjani and W Michael Reisman, “Interpreting Treaties for the 
Benefit of Third Parties: the ‘Salvors Doctrine’ and the use of Legislative 
History in Investment Treaties” (2010) 104:4 American Journal of 
International Law 597 at 599; Thomas Wälde, “Interpreting Investment 
Treaties: Experiences and Examples” in Christina Binder et al, eds, 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of 
Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) (observing 
that “[i]t is difficult to find a tribunal which formally and properly applied 
the Vienna Rules step by step” at 746).
113. ILC, 54th Sess, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) arts 4-5.
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cited by ISA tribunals and, to my knowledge, no commentator has 
criticized tribunals for citing them.
But beyond such “easy cases”, debate continues. Ongoing 
disagreement as to restrictive versus extensive interpretation may be 
justified with respect to permanent international judicial bodies, but 
given the contractarian structure of interpretive authority in ISA, an 
unqualified choice of international law in an IIA mandates an extensive 
approach to interpretation of the IIA. International law from outside the 
applicable IIA should be applied not only to shed light on the meaning of 
the IIA – to resolve disagreements as to the meaning of the text – but also 
as a source of obligations of the parties to the arbitration beyond those 
created by the IIA. This may appear, at first glance, to be a pro-investor 
position, since only states, not investors, have obligations under IIAs 
and, more generally in international law, non-state entities enjoy rights 
more than they incur obligations. However, international law principles 
may also limit states’ obligations or provide excuses for breaches of treaty 
obligations.
One’s attitude toward the interpretation and application of 
international law is inextricable from one’s attitude toward the 
independence of international law in relation to its main subject: states. 
If international law is always and entirely a product of state consent, and 
merely determines the reciprocal rights and duties of states that belong 
to an international community without limiting their sovereignty,114 
then the interpretation and application of international law should be 
limited to what is explicitly mentioned in the text of treaties and in 
written instruments in general. If, on the other hand, international law 
is an autonomous legal system that requires the consent of its subject 
to exist and determine its rules and principles, but that may have an 
impact beyond the express consent of states, then its interpretation 
and application might extend beyond the explicit words of written 
114. See e.g. James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the 
International Law of Peace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) at 1 (this may 
be described as the “classical view”); Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, 
International Law: A Treatise, vol I (Peace) (New York: Longman, Green, 
1912) at 366-67.
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instruments and the clearly-defined customary law of state practice.115
The VCLT crystalizes the understanding that treaties should be 
interpreted based on “their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”.116 It also recognizes that treaties, like other legal instruments, 
are not self-executing, nor are can they ever be entirely autonomous; 
they must therefore be interpreted within their broader legal context, 
including preambles, annexes, and agreements relating to treaties, as well 
as instruments connected to them and accepted by the parties.117 Finally, 
the VCLT requires that, in addition to the treaty’s context, subsequent 
agreements between the parties, or practice regarding the treaty’s 
interpretation and “relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties” must also be taken into consideration.118 
This is not to say that the VCLT is entirely contextualist in its 
approach; to the contrary, the first rule of VCLT Article 31 is that treaties 
should be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty”. At the same time, though, 
Article 31 does not impose pure textualism.119 The ordinary meaning 
of the treaty terms must be considered in their context and in light of their 
object and purpose. In this way, the VCLT adopts an approach that sits 
between pure textualism and pure contextualism. Most importantly for 
present purposes, the VCLT directs adjudicators to consider more than 
just the immediate context of the treaty – the circumstances surrounding 
its conclusion, including its drafting history – and to take into account 
115. See Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for 
Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2010) at 429-49. On developments in treaty interpretation generally, see 
Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) and Gerald Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias & Panos Merkouris, 
eds, Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
30 Years On (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010).
116. VCLT, supra note 66, art 31(1).
117. Ibid, art 31(2). 
118. Ibid, arts 31(3)(a)-(c). 
119. See e.g. Julian Davis Mortenson, “The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna 
Convention Hostile to Drafting History?” (2013) 107:4 American Journal 
of International Law 780.
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the treaty’s broader political and legal context, including conduct of the 
states parties not directly related to the treaty, as well as the full scope of 
international law rules applicable between the states parties.
Some argue that the VCLT mandates a two-stage interpretive process 
similar to the process of contractual interpretation in many common law 
jurisdictions; in the first stage, only the ordinary meaning of the words 
is to be considered; if, and only if, that meaning is vague or ambiguous 
or leads to results that contradict other provisions of the treaty may the 
adjudicator proceed to the second stage of interpretation, in which it 
may consider the treaty’s object and purpose.120 There is some support 
for this position in the travaux of the International Law Commission at 
the time of the drafting of the VCLT, as some ILC members emphasized 
“the primacy of the text as the basis for the interpretation of a treaty, 
while at the same time giving a certain place to extrinsic evidence of the 
intentions of the parties and to the objects and purposes of the treaty as 
means of interpretation”.121
However, applying this line of argument to the VCLT itself shows that 
it does not call for such strict textualism. Article 31(1) of the VCLT states 
simply that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose”. It says nothing about 
distinct stages of interpretation, nor does it limit the object and purpose 
of the treaty to a subsidiary or supplementary role. Rather, the ordinary 
meaning of the treaty text should be considered together with (“in light 
of”) the treaty’s object and purpose. The fact that other interpretive aids 
are expressly relegated to a subsidiary status122 shows that the treaty’s 
context and its object and purpose should not be left to a second stage of 
interpretation.
120. See e.g. Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern 
International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007) at 203.
121. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, ILC, 18th Sess, 
UN Doc A/CN.4/191 (1966) 187 at 218 [Draft Articles on Treaties].
122. VCLT, supra note 66 (specifically, “the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion”, art 32).
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Indeed, the International Law Commission itself pointed out that 
“the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose should be the first 
element to be mentioned”.123 Consequently, preference must be 
given to the ordinary meaning, which “is not to be determined in the 
abstract but in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object 
and purpose”.124 Article 31(1) does not foreclose consideration of the 
treaty’s object and purpose in the first instance; all it forecloses is “an 
investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties”.125 The VCLT 
therefore prescribes a method of interpretation that takes into account, 
together with the ordinary meaning of the text, the purpose of a treaty 
as a whole, including its preamble, and the area being interpreted 
(international law in general or its specific subdivisions), including its 
evolution through time (“emergent purpose”). These contextual materials 
will be particularly useful to adjudicators when they are called upon to 
fill gaps and apply treaties to circumstances not considered at the time of 
the treaty’s conclusion.
An example of this approach in action can be seen in the jurisprudence 
of international human rights courts. The object and purpose of human 
rights treaties is, generally speaking, the effective protection of individuals. 
Accordingly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) have both 
developed their jurisprudence by going beyond the mere grammatical 
interpretation of their respective treaties and seeking interpretations that 
advance such effective protection.
In Loizidou v Turkey,126 the ECtHR affirmed that “the object and 
purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of 
individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted 
and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective”.127 It 
added that a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the European 
123. Draft Articles on Treaties, supra note 121 at 220.
124. Ibid at 221.
125. Ibid.
126. (1995), 20 ECHR (Ser A) 99.
127. Ibid at para 72.
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Convention on Human Rights would “seriously weaken” the role of the 
ECtHR and would “diminish the effectiveness of the Convention as a 
constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public)”.128 
The corollary position that the Convention on Human Rights is a “living 
instrument” that requires dynamic interpretation to ensure that it 
continues to achieve its object and purpose, first expressed in Tyler v the 
United Kingdom,129 is continually reaffirmed by the ECtHR.130 
Arguably influenced by the ECtHR,131 the IACtHR has gone even 
further in crystalizing and extending the notion that human rights 
treaties must be interpreted to be effective in protecting individuals. 
Invoking what it called the “pro homine principle”,132 the IACtHR has, 
for example, held that States cannot damage an individual’s “life plan” 
without breaching their international law obligations;133 that indigenous 
communities have special rights to their lands;134 that the Court may take 
into consideration indigenous legal traditions;135 and that international 
law prohibits forced disappearances.136 
All of these judgements advanced the protection of human rights 
beyond the initial set of rights spelled out by the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights. The IACtHR, in its jurisprudence interpreting treaties 
pro homine, has made reference to other treaties, and to principles 
codified or developed in the context of international humanitarian law, 
128. Ibid at para 75.
129. (1978), 21 ECHR (Ser A) 612 (the Convention “is a living instrument 
which … must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions” at 
para 31).
130. See e.g. Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, No 25965/04, [2010] I ECHR 1, at 
paras 273-75.
131. Magnus Killander, “Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties” (2010) 
7:13 SUR – International Journal of Human Rights 145.
132. Sometimes called the pro personae principle.
133. Loayza Tamayo Case (Peru) (1998), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 42 at 
paras 144-54.
134. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case (Nicaragua) (2001), 
Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 79.
135. Aloeboetoe et al Case (Suriname) (1993), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 11.
136. Villagrán-Morales et al Case (Guatemala) (1999), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) 
No 63.
263(2017) 3(1) CJCCL
international environmental law, international investment law, and 
the international law of economic, social and cultural rights.137 The 
IACtHR has held that international human rights law is a part of public 
international law, but is lex specialis in cases that come before the Court; 
that is, international human rights law prevails over conflicting principles 
of general public international law, but only when its provisions are more 
favourable to the rights bearers in a specific case.138
ISA tribunals should take a page from the international human rights 
courts (although not necessarily from international human rights law). 
The primary lesson is that an IIA which makes an unqualified choice of 
international law cannot be interpreted according to the text of the treaty 
alone; instead, tribunals must interpret and apply it in such a way as to 
preserve its effectiveness, including by drawing on doctrines that do not 
appear in the treaty and may have been developed in different contexts. 
Thus far, many tribunals have been tentative in their treatment of 
international law beyond the investment context, restricting themselves 
to citing the VCLT, the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and 
a small handful of famous judgments like the Barcelona Traction139 
ruling on nationality and locus standi or the Chorzów Factory formula for 
compensation.140 
Such hesitation is unwarranted. Interpretation in international law 
is a necessarily subjective process, bound up as it is with uncertainty as 
to the sources of international law. But the IIA’s choice of law provision 
points the way. As Kelsen put it, “the work of interpretation is one of 
discovering the intention of the parties not only by reference to rules of 
interpretation, but to rules of international law bearing upon the subject-
137. See Lucas Lixinski, “Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International 
Law” (2010) 21:3 European Journal of International Law 585 at 603.
138. Ibid [emphasis in original].
139. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), 
[1964] ICJ Rep 6.
140. Factory At Chorzów Case (Germany v Poland) (1928), PCIJ (Ser A) No 17.
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matter of the disputed contractual stipulation”.141 If states call for a treaty 
to apply something as so open-ended as “international law” simpliciter, 
they thereby acquiesce, at minimum, to the arbitrators’ determination of 
the sources of that law.142 ISA tribunals should therefore take a wide view 
as to the scope of applicable norms in any given investment arbitration. 
In doing so, arbitrators will “give prudent effect to the truest expression 
of state intent in sacrificing sovereignty vis-à-vis foreign investments 
(thereby potentially fostering greater state commitment to the system)”.143
None of this is to suggest that all international law is always relevant, 
or that the treaty text is subordinate to general international law. The IIA 
remains lex specialis. Just like a contract in private law, it constitutes a 
derogation from all conflicting rules of general international law except 
non-derogable ius cogens. As an example of such derogations, Kurtz cites 
the customary rules on diplomatic protection,144 which entitles states to 
bring actions against other states for injuries caused to their nationals 
by internationally wrongful acts;145 these principles are excluded by 
141. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2d English ed) (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1970) at 355.
142. This point may also be shown by a counter-example, the phrase in many 
IIAs negotiated by the United States that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard be defined according to the customary international law standard 
for minimum treatment of aliens. See e.g. the final negotiated text of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 4 February 2016 (not yet in force), 
online: <ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/tpp-full-text> [Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 2016]. 
Article 9.6(2) states that, “for greater certainty”, the obligation of states 
to provide to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security “prescribes the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment to 
be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not 
create additional substantive rights.
143. Kurtz, supra note 8 at 281.
144. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 2016, supra note 142 at 283-84.
145. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries ILC, 58th Sess, 
UN Doc A/61/10 (2006) art 1; see also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v 
Congo), Preliminary Objections, [2007] ICJ Rep 582, at para 39.
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the ICSID Convention, which prohibits the extension of diplomatic 
protection to individuals who have brought direct claims against other 
states under IIAs subject to the ICSID Convention, “unless such other 
Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the 
award rendered in such dispute”.146
However, to the extent that the treaty is silent, or is vague or ambiguous 
(all of which are common in the existing IIAs), tribunals should consider 
the full sweep of international law to fill the gap or clarify the vagueness 
or ambiguity. In this exercise, tribunals should not limit themselves to 
doctrines specific to IIL or even to international economic law. IIL norms 
should only take precedence over other international law norms to the 
extent that the IIL norm is more favourable to the object and purpose of 
the IIA. Thus, tribunals’ authority to pluck principles from other areas of 
international law is not unlimited. They may venture outside the treaty 
text, but must remain inside the treaty’s legal and political framework.
In this light, it is important to remember that the object and purpose 
of IIAs, and of investment arbitration in particular, are to ensure fair, 
predictable, and non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investments, 
no more and no less.147 It has been argued that, since investors gain direct 
rights as subjects of IIAs, just like individuals gain direct rights as subjects 
146. Ibid, art 27(1).
147. As the Suez/Vivendi tribunal put it, “a recognized goal of international 
investment law is to establish a predictable, stable legal framework for 
investments”. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and 
Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentine Republic (2015), Case No ARB/03/19 at 
para 189 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). 
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of human rights treaties, the purpose of IIAs is to protect investor rights.148 
Indeed, especially in the earlier years of ISA, some tribunals “seemed not 
solely to simply assume that IIAs were concluded exclusively to protect 
investors, but also to make this assumption their ultimate guide to the 
interpretation of the agreement, establishing the peculiar presumption in 
dubio pro investore”.149 
However, the analogy to human rights is misplaced. These tribunals 
confused the promotion of investment with the promotion of investors. 
The purpose of IIAs is not to protect the profit margins of investors, 
although of course the promotion of investment is an intended and 
welcome consequence. Rather:
from a teleological point of view, investment treaties were initially concluded in 
order to induce FDI flows to states with developmental needs…. This differs a 
lot from the very idea at the heart of human rights or other individual-centered 
148. See generally Martins Paparinskis, “Analogies and Other Regimes of 
International Law” in Zachary Douglas et al, eds, The Foundations 
of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 79-85. See also Martins 
Paparinskis, “Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of 
State Responsibility” (2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 
617 at 617; Anastasios Gourgourinis, “Investors’ Rights Qua Human 
Rights? Revisiting the ‘Direct’/‘Derivative’ Rights Debate” in Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris, eds, The Interpretation and Application 
of the European Convention of Human Rights: Legal and Practical 
Implications (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) at 147; Francisco Gonzáles 
de Cossio, “Investment Protection Rights: Substantive or Procedural?” 
(2010) 25 ICSID Review 107. The issue has been taken up in some 
arbitrations, with mixed outcomes; see e.g. Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft 
v Argentina (2008), ICSID Case No ARB/04/14, at para 110; Archer 
Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc v 
Mexico (2007), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/05, at paras 161-80; ADF 
Group Inc v USA (2003), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/1, at para 152; 
Corn Products International, Inc v United Mexican States (2008), ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/04/1, at paras 167-179; and Cargill Inc v Mexico 
(2009), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/2, at paras 403-28.
149. Methymaki, supra note 72 at 3 (this is intended to be analogous to the pro 
homine principle adopted by human rights courts); see above, notes 122-
27 and accompanying text for clarification.
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regimes (eg, the law of consular relations), namely the protection of individuals 
because of considerations of humanity and due process.150 
Equally, the object and purpose of IIAs is not to insulate states from 
liability, although of course states can and should draft IIAs to preserve 
their ability to regulate in the public interest. The reason states enter 
into investment treaties is analogous to the reason states enforce contracts 
within their borders: to ensure the predictable and fair enforcement of 
legal obligations, with the expectation that a private market will flourish 
as a result. Therefore, in interpreting and applying IIAs, tribunals should 
adopt the interpretation that most fosters a fair, predictable, and non-
discriminatory (not necessarily profitable) regulatory environment for 
foreign investment.
VI. Conclusion
I have argued in this article that the interpretive authority of investment 
arbitrators is constrained primarily by the choice of law provisions in the 
IIAs that they interpret. The contractarian structure of arbitral authority 
in ISA means that arbitrators must not only apply the chosen laws as 
opposed to other laws, but must also interpret the chosen laws in the 
ways intended by the states parties to the IIA. I offered some rules of 
thumb for determining the states parties’ presumed intention in (the 
majority of ) cases where they have provided no guidance beyond naming 
“international law” as the law governing the dispute. I also offered 
something of a roadmap, drawing from the same theoretical principles 
about the structure of arbitral authority, for states to more effectively 
guide the discretion of arbitrators.
The main benefit of the proposed approach is greater certainty and 
consistency, assuming tribunals were to follow it – not consistency in 
the sense of absolute uniformity, which is impossible and probably 
undesirable, but a consistency of approach that is most likely to conform 
to the intentions of states when they issue regulations that may affect 
investors covered by the state’s international law obligations.
More broadly, the proposed approach would also help to rationalize 
150. Methymaki, ibid at 16.
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the interests of states and investors. On the one hand, investors do 
have legitimate expectations from investment treaties and the dispute 
resolution systems created by them, expectations on which they should 
be able to rely with some degree of certainty. On the other hand, ultimate 
control remains with states, as it should: they are the ones issuing a 
standing offer to arbitrate, and are entitled to set the terms of that offer. 
They can restrict or expand the range of available rules of decision in the 
arbitration agreement, or simply define it more precisely. They may issue 
joint interpretations of treaty terms that are binding on tribunals, even 
after disputes arise. To the extent that such actions would narrow the range 
of claims that investors may make, or reduce the damages recoverable 
for breaches, they would still benefit investors to the extent that they 
would create greater certainty. Widespread renunciation of IIAs fueled by 
political backlash, or even just a drastic narrowing of states’ obligations 
under IIAs, may be even more harmful to the global investment climate 
and the global rule of law.
